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The Impact of Recombining
Commercial and Investment Banking
Samuel L. Hayes IM
This paper will address the rejoining of commercial and
investment banking functions under one roof in the wake of the
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. While this
recombination has not returned the United States to the
capital market environment prevailing before the Glass-
Steagall Act was passed in 1933, it has engendered some
conflicts of interest with attendant harm to investors.
At the time of the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act and
other reform legislation in 1933 and 1934, the institutional
investor community was quite small, both in number and as a
proportion of the investor universe. Sales of new offerings, as
well as secondary trading, were directed predominantly toward
individual investors. Today, it is just the reverse. The huge
contemporary institutional investor community dominates the
markets and is sophisticated enough to take care of itself in
most cases.
One could argue that, taken as a whole, contemporary
investors are much better equipped to protect themselves
against these abuses than was true seventy years ago when
reform legislation was first put in place. But individual
investors, although now constituting a smaller share of the pie,
are still quite vulnerable. Thus, while caveat emptor might be
an appropriate regulatory stance for institutional investors, it
is not a sufficient decision rule for the interests of individual
investors. However, because a wholesale restructuring of the
banking system is no longer practical, any protection of
individual investors and the integrity of investment banking
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will depend upon patchwork legislation and self-regulation
within the existing regulatory framework.
Part I of this paper will briefly review the banking
environment in the U.S. before and during the Glass-Steagall
Act. In the pre-Glass-Steagall world, discussed in Part I.A, a
wide portfolio of activities could be performed by the same
vendor. The resulting conflicts of interest and other economic
factors present during the 1920s culminated in the stock
market crash of 1929, and the ensuing economic depression
precipitated the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933. Part
I.B explains how the market conditions that developed over the
middle of the twentieth century led to the repeal of the Act in
1999. Part II of this paper will contrast the post-Glass-Steagall
world of finance and business, providing some examples of
instances where the unregulated recombination of commercial
and investment banking has permitted conflicts of interest.
Finally, Part III of this paper considers the claim that
contemporary investors are sufficiently equipped to protect
themselves and concludes that individual investors will be
harmed without some modification to the existing regulatory
framework.
I. COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING BEFORE AND
DURING THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
A. The Pre-Glass -Steagall World
The Pre-Glass-Steagall world was a largely unregulated
one where rampant conflicts of interest were accepted as the
norm. Individual executives could wear multiple hats with
impunity and could personally enrich themselves with deals
and participations that would be barred to modern day
professionals. For instance, George F. Baker, the man who
built the First National Bank in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, was a particular prot6g6 of J.P. Morgan.'
Not only did Morgan regularly include Baker's bank in deals he
was engineering, but Morgan also made available to George
Baker opportunities to benefit personally in a number of deals.2
SHERIDAN A. LOGAN, GEORGE F. BAKER AND His BANK, 1940-1955 (1981).
Baker's personal wealth grew to such an extent that he was able to single-
handedly finance the building and endowment of a new Harvard Business School
campus in 1925. The timing was inauspicious, because Baker's blind optimism about
the U.S. economy caused not only his bank to suffer but also resulted in grievous losses
to him personally in the aftermath of the 1929 Crash. See id. at 236-49.
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Similarly, a senior executive of the New York Life Insurance
Co., George H. Perkins, Jr., was invited to join J.P. Morgan &
Co. as a full partner in 1901 without giving up his leadership
position at New York Life.3 Needless to say, the degree of
collaboration between these two financial institutions was
extremely close during that period, raising serious conflict-of-
interest issues. Such was the loyalty and trust in Morgan on
the part of senior officers of most of the leading money center
banks that he essentially had access to a "blind pool" of funds
to be called on at his discretion.'
That was also a world in which a banker's personal
"honor" and his institution's sense of "noblesse oblige" were the
main assurances which investors and the public at large could
rely upon for fair dealing.! Unfortunately, that was not a
uniformly shared trait among bankers and, moreover, the
definition of "good behavior" was subject to wide interpretation.
As a consequence, "stock pools" and other schemes to
manipulate securities prices, "watered" stock issues, and a
variety of other maneuvers (many of which had the effect of
defrauding small, unsophisticated investors) were rampant,
with little if any regulatory machinery to either curb or punish
the initiators.'
Thus, the reform legislation of the 1930s had as one of
its most important objectives the elimination, or at least the
curtailment of, blatant conflicts of interest inherent in the
"universal" banks that had up until then dominated the U.S.
financial marketplace.' The Glass-Steagall Act was clearly
aimed at the inherent potential for abuse when a single
financial firm could accept deposits, speculate in the securities
markets using depositors' funds, hold substantial (including
control) positions in their corporate customers, underwrite
these companies' new securities offerings, and, if convenient,
stuff slow-moving offerings8 into mutual funds or individual
3 JOHN ROUSMANIERE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE EQUITABLE 74 (1995).
4 RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY
AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE (1990).
' See, e.g., 1 CYRUS ADLER, JACOB H. SCHIFF: HIS LIFE AND LETTERS 22-24
(1928).
6 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 (1979) (1954).
7 See, e.g., Stock Exchange Practices, Part 8, Chase Securities Corporation:
Hearing Before Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong. (1933).
8 That is, in offerings where a syndicate of banks had promised to
underwrite a securities issue at a fixed price and subsequently found there was scant
demand at that price level.
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investment accounts they managed. The reform legislation
anticipated that the industry would largely police itself
through its self-regulatory organizations (SROs), which
included the New York Stock Exchange and the National
Association of Securities Dealers. The Securities and Exchange
Commission would set certain standards and would serve as a
watchdog, ready to intervene when the SRO system faltered.
B. The Business World Climate During the Glass-Steagall
Act
The Glass-Steagall Act forced the split-up of the
previously comprehensive banking houses into their
commercial banking and investment banking components
This split, however, did not lead to a stampede of resources to
the securities side of this new Chinese Wall. Indeed, at the
time of its passage, the grass was comparatively greener in
commercial banking's back yard than in the securities
business. The stock market was in complete disarray (down
almost 80% from its pre-1929 high), U.S. business activity had
imploded, and, far from issuing any new securities, most
corporations were undergoing massive layoffs and in many
cases declaring bankruptcy." While the U.S. commercial
banking operations were hard hit, they were by comparison a
stronger and much larger part of most banking houses' total
assets and revenue stream than the securities activities.
Therefore, the "best and the brightest" of the personnel and
most of the physical assets usually stayed with the commercial
banking side in the forced separations. The securities business
was by contrast a small appendage in both assets and revenue,
and oftentimes the less highly-regarded executives were
assigned to be spun off with that business." A long decline in
commercial banking's share of the country's financing and
savings business began shortly after World War II." The
9 The term "investment banking" was the name subsequently given in the
U.S. to these securities business spin-offs, in part to distinguish them from the
European "merchant" banks, which in most countries were free of the legislated
division imposed on their American counterparts.
'0 GALBRAITH, supra note 6.
" See, e.g., JOSHEPH AUERBACH & SAMUEL L. HAYES, INVESTMENT BANKING
AND DILIGENCE: WHAT PRICE DEREGULATION? 86 (1986); Samuel L. Hayes, Investment
Banking Power Structure in Flux, 49 HARV. Bus. REV. 138 (1971).
12 See Dwight B. Crane et al., Capital Market Intermediaries: Summary
Observations on a Workshop Held at Harvard Business School (May 2003)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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diminutive investment banking units that had been cast adrift
in the 1930s began to thrive and grow as corporate financing
activities moved into the public markets arena, from which the
U.S. commercial banks were largely barred.
Glass-Steagall had isolated the fledgling investment
banks in a unique environment, somewhat like the species on
the Galapagos Islands. They were forced to cut their teeth in
this vibrant market and develop a range of skills and an
organizational culture which would prove to be extremely
valuable in today's marketplace.13 The commercial banks, on
the other hand, were stuck in what increasingly came to be
regarded as a financial backwater. Thus, in the 1960s, they
began clamoring for regulatory permission to move back into
the securities business. The profit margins earned by the
securities firms were now contrasting favorably with the
generally shrinking margins available in the conventional
commercial banking sector.
II. THE POST-GLASS-STEAGALL ENVIRONMENT
Today, the situation is the reverse of the 1930s. The
securities firms are the contemporary five hundred pound
gorillas, and it is the commercial banks who now salivate for
the investment bankers' lines of business. Constant pressure
by the commercial banks for relief from the constrictors
imposed by Glass-Steagall led to the erosion and ultimately the
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. This has brought
about a competitive restructuring which has been
characterized as a "convergence" of commercial and investment
banking. That is something of a misnomer. The
reconfigurations have been mostly a one-way street. U.S.
investment banks have had little interest in stand-alone
corporate lending or other relatively low-margin, asset-
intensive commercial banking businesses. It is the large money
center banks who have rushed into the investment bankers'
backyards, pursuing the lush pickings of high-margin,
securities-related fees for midwifing mergers and acquisitions,
raising new capital in the public markets, and engaging in
certain securities trading operations. They have accomplished
13 There is considerable research on the importance of a vigorously
competitive home market in sharpening a vendor's skills in competing abroad. See, e.g.,
Mariko Sakakibara & M.E. Porter, Competing at Home to Win Abroad: Evidence from
Japan Industry, 83 REV. ECON. & STAT. 310 (2001).
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this almost exclusively by purchasing well-established
securities firms after earlier efforts to grow these lines of
business internally fell short of their goals. 4
The following sections discuss a few of the potentially
problematic areas that have arisen in the wake of the repeal of
the Glass-Steagall Act. These include the development of a
credit war which has implications for the integrity of the
banking system, the debasement of public trust in the value of
Wall Street brands, concerns about the accuracy of securities
pricing, difficulties with organizational structure and risk
exposure, and certain conflicts of interest inherent in the
multiple roles which financial institutions now play.
A. The Credit War
Commercial banks have used their lending capabilities
to attract underwriting and mergers and acquisitions business
away from the traditional investment banks." Presumably, in a
number of cases they have offered below-market interest rates
on these loans and one suspects that in other instances they
have extended volumes of credit beyond what their credit
committees would have normally thought prudent. Banks have
also been charged with "tying in" high margin investment
banking mandates in exchange for cheap loans. Traditional
investment banks have fought back, not by acquiring large
commercial banks as a vehicle for extending comparable credit,
but by directly utilizing both their own balance sheets and
their loan syndication skills to match many of these bank-
funding blandishments.
The upshot of this credit war is that the initial
advantage enjoyed by the commercial banks in new business
solicitation has been substantially neutralized. Many potential
securities issuers now expect any vendor soliciting their
investment banking business to provide large and sweetened
lending facilities as a quid quo pro. This is a "reverse tying"
phenomenon. The net affect of demanding this commercial loan
" Chemical/Chase Bank was a holdout for the "make" rather than the "buy"
strategy until it finally threw in the towel with the 2000 purchase of J.P. Morgan & Co.
Ironically, J.P. Morgan was the only money center commercial bank, which had
managed to internally grow a robust investment banking arm, although it required
some 25 years to accomplish it!
15 Jathon Sapsford, Banks Give Wall Street a Run for its Money, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 5, 2004, at C1.
[Vol. 70:1
COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING
"subsidy" is to effectively reduce the margins on investment
banking services that have been bundled with such loans."
This phenomenon raises questions about the credit
quality of these lending facilities and potentially threatens the
integrity of individual lenders as well as of the U.S. banking
system as a whole. A case in point is the credit backing for the
issuance of commercial paper. Some large commercial banks
appear to be materially underpricing the standby bank lines
that they write for corporate customers' short-term commercial
paper operations as an inducement to obtain their investment
banking assignments." What is the actual credit quality of
these lines? Are there adequate loss reserves booked,
particularly where the loan maturity is less than one year?
These questions are beyond the scope of this paper but
research is clearly needed in this area.
B. Debasement of Public Trust in Wall Street Brands
It is not yet clear what impact the entrance of
commercial banks into the securities business will have on the
brand images of the firms they have purchased. The
imprimatur of the major Wall Street securities firms used to be
a source of solid reassurance to investors, both pre-Glass-
Steagall and for several decades following World War II. In
that era, investors in new securities offerings shepherded by
leading U.S. securities firms could assume that careful due
diligence on a securities issuer had been undertaken, and that
the underwriter stood foursquare behind the representations of
quality for the product being offered. Relationships between
companies and particular underwriters were long-standing,
and, over time, the investment bankers came to know their
clients intimately. If a company's affairs went awry, its
bankers were expected to go to work and help fix the problems,
and in fact they often did."
Today, investors cannot routinely rely on underwriters'
due diligence investigations to undergird new securities
offerings. The widespread use of "shelf' registrations has
turned many debt underwritings into de facto competitive
16 See, e.g., Randall Smith, Pay to Play? Companies Put a New Squeeze on
Their Investment Banks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2003, at Al.
7 While research does not disclose any systematic studies on this practice,
some market participants have alleged to me that it is occurring.
"' See ADLER, supra note 5, at 141-48.
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bidding events. Underwriters might not undertake due
diligence, instead relying completely on the issuers' periodic
SEC filings." Even if an underwriter works with a company to
bring its equity shares to the public market for the first time,
there can be no expectation of long-term loyalty on the part of
the underwriter. If an issuer's business seriously falters or
some malfeasance is uncovered, that underwriter is likely to
cut and run (after fulfilling the bare minimum required by law)
rather than stand by the company and extend aid. By the same
token, today's typical corporate customer feels little loyalty to
investment banks with whom she has done past business, and,
if her bargaining position is strong, often adopts an attitude of
"what have you done for me lately?""° Any concern about the
"subtle hazard" of too close an identification of the investment
bankers with their corporate clients' top management must
therefore assume a short-term context.
Commercial banks, on the other hand, have a long
tradition of working with their corporate customers when they
encounter trouble. Perhaps this is because, unlike the
underwriters in the aftermath of a public offering, the bank is
the one with its own money still at risk and in adversity there
is unlikely to be anyone willing to take their place. Whether
this commercial banking practice and culture will be effectively
transferred to the new role as investment banker remains to be
seen.
C. Concerns About Accurate Pricing
One might assume that today's vastly larger and more
efficient securities markets would give investors confidence
that the pricing of new securities issues will be much more
reliable than in past decades, thereby mitigating the reduced
underwriter oversight discussed in the previous section. On
straight debt offerings that is likely to be true. However, it is
still difficult for investors to assess the fairness of the pricing of
new issues of hybrid (derivative) securities. And initial public
offerings (IPOs) are the trickiest of all. Traditional investment
banks as well as commercial bank entrants into the securities
19 AUERBACH & HAYES, supra note 11, at 117.
20 Institutional Investor magazine used to publish a "Who's with Whom" list
of each investment bank's ongoing clients. It was discontinued in 1979 after many
protests from companies that did not want to be identified with any particular
investment bank.
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business have recently been caught up in scandals involving
the pricing of such initial offerings, their allocation to favored
investors, and promises obtained for further price-boosting
purchases in the aftermarket.2' Another group of players in this
market sector, the leveraged buyout firms and the private
equity venture firms, have reportedly also played the
"spinning" game2 but have thus far escaped significant
regulatory attention.
A fairer way to handle the pricing and distribution of
new securities might be provided by the "Dutch Auction"
method of securities offering. Under this approach, bids are
accepted for specific quantities of the security at specific prices.
The least favorable price at which all the securities are taken
up becomes the price at which the entire offering is sold. This
has the result of obtaining maximum sale proceeds for the
issuing company and largely eliminating the potential for rapid
run-up of the offering price in the immediate aftermarket. It
thus also eliminates the potential for abuse in the allocation of
shares in hot IPOs where large short-term windfall gains are
available."
This form of offering is not favored by the leading
securities underwriters, however. They argue that a Dutch
Auction precludes any opportunity for the underwriter to
arrange for a judicious apportionment and placement of the
securities among institutional and individual investors, and
complicates efforts to manage an orderly secondary market.
Although not usually mentioned by investment bankers, it also
removes much of the rationale for the high gross spreads which
persist in IPOs 2
21 See, e.g., Inside Frank Quattrone's Money Machine, BUS. WK., Oct. 13,
2003, at 104; Don Jamieson, Grubman's Goodbye, ON WALL ST., June 1, 2003, available
at LEXIS, News & Business, News.
22 That is, they have allocated valuable IPO shares to institutions or
individuals in return for favors.
23 Randall Smith, Controlling IPOs: New Steps Would Limit Big 'Pops', WALL
ST. J., May 30, 2003, at C1.
14 Although the Dutch auction has been used in the past with certain types of
debt offerings, William Hambrecht & Co., a west coast securities boutique, has been
the lone promoter of this distribution method for equity IPOs. Ravenswood Winery was
the first Dutch auction IPO Hambrecht undertook, in 1999. Since then, the firm has
done seven more such offerings. Most recently, the search engine firm Google has
announced that it, too, will utilize a Dutch auction when it goes public in late summer
2004.
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D. Concerns about Organizational Structure and Risk
Exposure
In a number of instances of alleged abuses within
securities firms, it has been strategically placed individuals
who have led both the firm and investors into disaster.' This
observation highlights another characteristic of the securities
business which makes it vulnerable to conflicts of interest and
abuse: its necessarily heavy reliance on the skill and integrity
of key employees. To encourage innovation and an
entrepreneurial drive for profits, securities firms tend to be
decentralized, with relatively flat management structures.
This, of course, leaves the firms exposed to miscreant actions
by individuals that can have an outsized impact on the firm
and on associated investors. While traditional investment
banks have in most cases managed to survive the severe
buffeting which out-of-control employee actions have on
occasion caused, the dramatic growth in their size and
complexity in recent years is worrisome for the future.
Commercial banks, on the other hand, have long
employed a much more hierarchical structure, with checks and
balances to limit the damage that single individuals or small
groups can inflict on the bank's overall risk exposure and
operating results. While this pyramid structure is an
advantage in curbing the danger from rogue employees, it is
better suited to traditional commercial banking activities than
to the securities business. The commercial banks that have
entered the investment banking business in recent years are
thus not necessarily well equipped, by either experience or
organizational culture, to manage the decentralized reporting
structure, which the securities business requires.
Further, the trend toward commercial banking
concentration that is creating trillion dollar mega banks does
nothing to assuage fears of commercial banking missteps in the
securities business. The long-term difficulties in managing
these huge holding companies are daunting, and the likelihood
that they will produce the synergistic results currently being
25 See, e.g., Sara Web et al., Baring Brothers Teeters over Huge Losses by
Trader, Sparking Market Fears, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1995, at 1; Rotten at the
Core, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 1991, at 69.
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touted by their advocates is not promising, particularly if past
experience is any guide."6
E. Other Conflicts of Interest
Many of the conflicts of interest that have garnered the
most public attention in the past several years are not a
function of whether or not commercial banks are involved in
the securities business. These conflicts are present for any
vendor who operates in these markets. Several of them deserve
mention here.
In recent years, securities analysts have replaced "new
business" professionals as the most effective rainmakers to
obtain lucrative underwriting and merger and acquisition
assignments. Corporate executives are no longer interested in
talking to the investment banking "generalists" who had long
served as liaisons with both current and potential corporate
clients. Because the potential compensation to a securities
analyst for working with the firm's investment bankers usually
dwarfs the stingy soft dollar rewards from advising
institutional investors, it is not surprising that a number of
analysts have been lured into an unhealthy collaboration with
their firms' investment banking groups. This collaboration has
produced egregious misbehavior, and individual investors are
often the biggest losers.
Securities firms' ownership of major specialist firms,
which make markets on the New York and other stock
exchanges, has similarly been ill-advised from the start. Given
most securities firms' large proprietary trading operations, it is
puzzling that they should also be allowed to own the market-
making organizations through which many of their trades are
funneled. Recent revelations of "front running" by specialist
firms with confidential knowledge of buy and sell orders in the
"book" is totally unacceptable. Some of that information may
'r Securities analysts and other market participants promote the idea that
the combined entity can fuse complimentary and/or overlapping businesses to obtain
substantial back office savings, more effective marketing and distribution of products
and services, and, overall, a powerful integrated entity which can take business away
from smaller and less comprehensive competitors. The complexities of merging large,
well-established entities and reconciling their cultures and turf claims has proved
daunting in past combinations and it has sometimes taken many years to yield much
synergy. See, e.g., PHILIPPE C. HASPESLAGH & DAVID B. JEMISON, MANAGING
ACQUISITIONS: CREATING VALUE THROUGH CORPORATE RENEWAL (1991). See also
Chirstopher A. Bartlett & Sumantra Ghoshal, Beyond the M-Form: Toward a
Managerial Theory of the Firm, 14 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 23 (1993).
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even leak back to the trading desks of the investment banks
who own the specialist firms.
It has long been understood that a number of potential
conflicts of interest are presented when the same firm
undertakes multiple activities that are dependent on the same
information base. Nevertheless, a number of leading securities
firms have proprietary risk arbitrage desks which can earn
lucrative returns by picking up bits and pieces of undisclosed
information and trading on it. These same firms typically have
corporate finance groups, which are in close touch with
companies of interest to the arbitrageurs. These firms also
have securities research groups who obtain insights that may
not be known to the investing public. Once the research groups
have formulated an overall opinion on the company in question,
there is a period of time before their report is publicly released.
That advance information could be quite valuable to the
arbitrage desk. Affording protection to confidential information
arising from a commercial banking function in a financial
vendor's portfolio of business lines only adds to the potential for
abuse. The critical component here is the management and
protection of the flow of sensitive information within a
securities firm.
III. CONCLUSION
This paper has already dismissed the possibility that
the U.S. will return to anything like the unregulated pre-Glass-
Steagall financial market world. Although there are some gaps
in the regulatory coverage, remedies for many of the holes
discussed above are currently being considered. 7 Over the
years, most activities in the financial sector have been assigned
to one or more governmental regulatory bodies as well as the
SROs. The Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, in supplanting the Glass-
Steagall Act, is designed to provide guidelines for the
operations of the multi-line holding companies that have
emerged.
Though today's financial world is heavily (if unevenly)
regulated by multiple federal and state governmental agencies,
self-regulation has become a necessity because the size, scope,
and complexity of the financial markets make detailed
" These include regulatory moves to separate investment research from
investment banking and to provide greater equity in the distribution of new securities
issues.
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oversight impractical. Legislative statutes and administrative
rules abound and the ever-present fear of litigation has an
important positive impact on individual and institutional
behavior. The incentive for the industry to do an effective job of
policing itself has been the threat of both severe punishments
for offending individuals and firms and the imposition of
additional onerous rules and/or legislation. The SEC, despite
some recent stumbles, has been an effective "big stick" and is
widely copied around the world.
The regulatory skein that is in place today is not ideal,
however. Like Topsy, it "just growed" over time in response to
unfolding needs and problems. It is not the structure one would
fashion if one were starting with a blank canvas. The U.S.
regulatory apparatus has largely been constructed to deal with
clusters of like-function financial firms. Thus, for instance, the
SEC has focused on securities firms and the Federal Reserve,
and the Comptroller of the Currency have supervised
commercial banks. But as we observe the proliferation of
financial activities and business lines under one corporate
umbrella, the historical institution-focused regulation looks
increasingly outdated. Conceptually, a functional approach
makes a lot more sense. But, like the arbitrary and sometimes
dysfunctional political subdivisions long ago mapped out by
European colonial powers in regions of Africa and the Middle
East, it is probably too late to think of dismantling existing
regulatory structures and starting over. We will have to work
within the structure we have now, patching the holes as they
become visible and hoping that we aren't creating such a
labyrinth of rules, regulations, and duties that we crush the
private financial market goose that has over time laid many
golden eggs for investors and supported the economic growth
that has benefited the public at large.
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